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Summary 
This paper analyzes the difficulties of comparing the respective effectiveness of two among 
the most important liability regimes in tort law: rule of negligence and strict liability. 
Starting from the standard Shavellian unilateral accident scheme, I show that matching up 
liability regime on their capacity to provide the highest level of safety is ineffective. This 
demonstration lies on two components. The first one gathers some results drawn from 
literature that introduces uncertainty. The second one takes into consideration the beliefs 
of agents and their aversion to ambiguity. The model applies uncertainty to the level of 
maximum damage. This demonstration reinforces the previous result. Hence, both regimes 
apply on specific tort question and comparing their individual efficiency needs to call for 
other components as the transaction costs associated to the burden of evidence, the 
fairness between victims and injurers, etc.  
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0.  Introduction 
Since Ronald Coase’s pioneering paper “The social Cost” (Coase (1960)), scholars 
have particularly studied and formalized the economic incidences of tort law
2 and particularly 
the legal liability question which is now an important regulatory policy instrument. Legal 
liability threatens potential injurers with having to pay for the harms they cause, even if 
insurance can also provide compensation more cheaply. Hence, for economists, the primary 
social function of liability system is to provide incentives to induce potential injurers to 
increase their level of prevention. More particularly, one among the major research trends 
centers on the comparison of the different liability regimes to achieve this task. Steven 
Shavell (Shavell (1985), Shavell (1987)) fathered the most popular touchstone accident model 
used by modern literature. Hence, to minimize the social costs of a major harm, a rational 
regulator can enforce either a liability regime based on fault (as a rule of negligence), or on a 
no-fault regime (strict liability), this, according the relative performance of each in providing 
safety. 
Broadly speaking, under negligence, injurers can escape liability if they have taken 
due care while strict liability regimes induce the injurers’ responsibility whatever their safety 
effort and independently of any fault. In practice, strict liability is much less used than 
negligence (Cantu (2001)) and is applied for Environment protection, ultra-hazardous 
activities and products defaults. Negligence is invoked for the whole remaining fields. Despite 
this division of role, determining the most appropriate liability scheme generates keen debates 
among economists. The choice criterion is efficiency in the providing of the highest level of 
care. In the eighties, authors
3 showed that both regimes perform equivalently and minimize 
primary costs, i.e., the sum of the cost of care and of expected accident losses. These results 
are reached under specific assumptions as certainty about the level of maximum damage, no 
consideration for the activity level, etc. However, if stating equivalence needs strong 
assumptions, relaxing them opens the Pandora’s box of ambivalent results about the kind of 
regime to enforce. Actual debates bear upon whether uncertainty should favor either strict 
liability or negligence. For instance, Newman and Wright (1990) demonstrate that in the 
                                                            
2 According Kaplow and Shavell (1999), Bentham in the XIXth Century conceived the modern analysis of law 
and Coase in 1960 extended this analysis to probabilistic extenalities. Beyond Coase's (1960) article, the sixties 
and seventies expanded this field with Becker's (1968) article on crime and law enforcement. The first systematic 
work on accident law has been provided by Calabresi (1970) while Posner (1972) studied economic analysis of 
law. 
3 Shavell (1980b), Shavell (1987b), Landes and Posner (1987), Shavell (1980), Landes and Posner (1981), Pozzo 
(1996)). 3 
 
presence or absence of moral hazard within the firm, strict liability induces the principal to 
offer a contract which gives rise to a socially optimal level of care. This level varies according 
the presence or the absence of moral hazard. Conversely, Demougin and Fluet (1999) show 
that when the agent earns a positive rent, strict liability will generate an under provision of 
care. Then negligence rule is more efficient than strict liability. Asymmetric information is 
typically vicarious liability which is the liability of one party, generally the ‘principal’ for 
wrongdoing of another party, the ‘agent’ (here the operator)
4. 
Most of these contributions tend to consider as relevant the fact of comparing liability 
schemes on the grounds of their efficacy. However, a close examination of the legal 
foundation of each regime shows that switching from one to the other one can hardly be done 
on this basis. Hence, this paper shows that many other factors should be considered as for 
instance fairness, transaction costs in seeking evidence, etc. 
Indeed, uncertainty means not only that agents ignore the value of fundamental 
variables but, also, that they form beliefs about them and determine their choice on them. 
Consequently, they express either preference or aversion for ambiguity, optimism or 
pessimism. In a seminal work, J.C. Teitelbaum (2007) introduced ambiguity theory in the 
basic accident model. This author felt unsatisfied with the expected utility theory used in the 
basic unilateral accident model. Basically, this model lets aside Knightian uncertainty that 
deals with unknown or ambiguous probability distributions. Consequently, Teitelbaum 
introduced attitudes towards uncertainty as optimism (ambiguity lovers) or pessimism 
(ambiguity aversion). He shows that sensitive operators to ambiguity will either over-invest in 
prevention (pessimistic) or under-invest in it (optimistic). In both cases, the required socially 
optimal level of prevention is never met.  
Our goals and treatment of ambiguity will be quite different. In our approach, agents 
are uncertain on the scale of the maximum damage induced by the major harm. This point is 
quite realistic and follows Cooter (1984) or Beard (1990) that conceived that major harm may 
be considered as a random variable. Indeed, the consequences of an accident are generally 
unknown. For instance, the explosion of a chemical plant will have different impact on 
population according the moment it happens in the day, whether it induces some disastrous 
blaze or not, whether the weather is rainy, etc, this independently of the maximum level of 
                                                            
4 Concerning this field, we can consider the works of Sykes (1984), Sykes (1988) and Sykes (1998). We refer 
equally to Kornhauser (1982) or still Polinsky and Shavell (1993), Schmitz (2000), Dari-Mattiacci, and Parisi 
(2003), Dari-Mattiacci (2006). We can mention too Segerson and Tietenberg, (1992), Menell (1991). For a 
global analysis see also Larsson (1999). 4 
 
care effort. From this basis, our main goal consists in characterizing the feature of each 
liability regime through uncertainty. 
Ambiguity theory helps in putting into evidence more deeply the fundamental 
differences between the liability regimes that prevent considering that switching from one to 
another one is only a matter of efficiency. In few words, we show that choosing among 
liability scheme cannot be done on the usual criteria of efficiency, but rather on some other 
richer grounds. This opens the door to elements such as fairness between victims and 
polluters, the minimization of transaction costs, etc. 
In the first part of this paper we recall the main results reached by literature about the 
equivalence question of both regimes under certainty and uncertainty. We study the 
assumptions under which are reached the main results. A second part analyzes the comparison 
of strict liability and negligence rule under ambiguity and we put into evidence the theoretical 
impossibility to achieve such a task. A third part concludes. 
1.  The equivalence between liability regimes is not robust under 
uncertainty 
Concerning the standard accident model applied to environmental matters, liability 
regimes are equivalent only under assumptions (Shavell (1985), (1987) or Landes and Posner 
(1987)). Essentially, agents (polluters and victims) are gifted with Von Neumann Morgenstern 
utility functions and are supposed neutral to risk. In addition, the probability distribution of 
accidents is common knowledge. Only unilateral preventive actions of the polluter are 
considered because victims cannot do it. It is few mentioned that comparing regime is made 
considering efficiency only and not fairness as Shavell (1982, p.121) highlights it when 
dealing with the victims: “(.) under the negligence rule injurers do not bear risk – if they are 
not negligent, they will not have to pay damages when involved in accidents – and victims do 
bear risk”.  
1.1 The equivalence between strict liability and negligence rule  
Here, we do consider the case of certainty about the scale of damage and we present 
the standard model (Cooter (1984), Shavell (1980) and (1987)) as a benchmark.  
Notations : 
 
-  , the level of effort of prevention 
-  , the amount of maximum damage, where  , which means that for a 
given effort level, the maximum damage is poorly known by Society.  5 
 
-  , probability of a major accident which depends on the achieved level of 
prevention, where  ,  . 
-  In the following we denote by “NR” the negligence rule regime, no index means 
“strict liability”. The index “P” denotes the injurer or polluter, “A” the victims.  
We present the standard unilateral accident model which bears no uncertainty on the 
scale of damage ( . The injurer’s looks at minimizing the expected prevention costs: 
(1)   s.c.   
While the victim’s expect costs of the harm under the strong assumption that damages 
are fully compensated: 
(2)    
The social cost from the regulator view point   is then (1)+(2):  
(3)   s.c.   
We have to note the perfect correspondence between the objective of the regulator and 
the one of the injurer. Indeed, the first order conditions give: 
 for   such that   
 is the socially optimal level of safety effort. This result is well known and 
constitutes the yardstick for this analysis.  
We consider now the case of negligence rule. Following Richard Posner (2007, p.167-
71), the understanding of negligence corresponds to the Hand Formula which is a “reasonable 
precaution” or precaution which is cost justified. Under the certain case about 
damages , the expected prevention costs depend on the effective compliance with the 
optimal prevention cost. Consequently, they correspond to this classical presentation: 
(4)   
The operator will comply by engaging a level of prevention equal or higher to 
 (i.e; the socially optimal safety effort). As a consequence, for victims, the expected 
costs of a risky activity write as: 
(5)   
Indeed, when the harm occurs, the victim bears its full consequences when the 
operator complies with the optimum level of safety. Consequently, for the regulator, the social 
cost writes as  6 
 
(6)   
A rational injurer supplies the socially optimal level of care and spends   . As a 
consequence, the expected social cost will settled at:  . 
Hence, the equivalence of both schemes holds because the social costs under either 
plan are identical and because agents are led to choose the same socially optimal level of 
effort, that is to say  . The only difference is that, under negligence, liability waiver 
occurs only if the polluter achieves this level of effort.  
Undermining the assumption of certainty about the maximum damage leads to a sub-
optimal situation because the polluters are not encouraged to supply the optimal level of 
effort(Cooter (1984)). 
1.2 Uncertainty and the lack of equivalence between liability regimes  
Now, let us consider the general case according which victim and polluter are 
uncertain about the effective level of the due compensation that may be either   (i.e. the 
effective level of damage), or  , ( ) where   is the level assessed by the court. This 
discrepancy is due for instance to the scientific uncertainty about the extent of damages. 
Hence, the underestimation of the harm is made with a probability equal to ,  , 
and the effective assessment appears with a probability of  . We analyze successively the 
strict liability regime and the negligence rule.  
Strict liability 
Under this regime, the injurer’s program is: 
(7) 
 s s.c.  . And, for the victims:  
(8)   
, where 
. Then, the social planner’s program expresses as:  
(9) 
 s.c.  . 
In spite of the assumption of two levels of damage, the social cost integrates only the 
higher value of the harm. This different program will give different solutions. Proposition 1 
shows that if   is the optimal social level of care, and if   is the optimum level of safety for 
the injurer, then  . 7 
 
Proposition 1: Under uncertainty about the level of maximum damages and under a 
strict liability regime, the level of prevention effort supplied by the potential injurer is socially 
sub-optimal. 
Proof: Indeed,   and 
 with obviously   
because   and  , then   
because by assumption  ,and, as a consequence  ) as shown in figure 
1. 
[insert figure 1] 
Uncertainty about the value of damage creates an agency relationship between the 
operator and the regulator: the firm’s interest is to not comply with the socially optimal level 
of prevention
5. Indeed, under a strict liability rule, it is only necessary to bring it to that level 
that minimizes its prevention cost level. Indeed, the regulator would like that society performs 
the highest level of prevention at the minimum social cost level which is not the case for 
. Consequently, there is a clear discrepancy between the objectives of the firms and the 
ones of the regulator. To implement the level   the regulator has to design a specific 
mechanism. This is the road followed by Newman and Wright (1992). By another argument 
we find again the result of Cooter (1984). Does this result consecrate the superiority of the 
negligence rule in this context? This is the point to study now. 
Uncertainty and negligence rule  
Conversely to strict liability, under negligence, injurers are held liable in tort if they 
did not take reasonable precautions only. Hence, the judge must not only seek the causal link 
between the harm and the polluting activity, but also assess the adequacy of prevention 
compared to the damage scale. Then, for some type of repeated accidents (road traffic, work 
accident) the process may be detrimental for victims. As Calabresi (1970) showed it, 
negligence involves high transaction costs, especially considering automobile accident. 
Resorting to strict liability is preferable because it limits the time devoted to prove the fault 
existence. The prevalence of one regime compared to another one depends on specific 
circumstances (sector of activity, frequency of accidents, their scale, etc.). The economic 
                                                            
5 See for instance the analysis of Newman and Wright (1990) that induced a trend of researches in this area.  8 
 
analysis of law considers that strict liability and negligence rule are substitutes. Hence, 
negligence rule could appear as a natural shelter if strict liability cannot be enforced.  
Based on existing literature, the rule of negligence cannot lead enforcing an optimal 
level of prevention. Consequently, the expected accident cost corresponds to the following 
lines: 
(10)   
The consequences for victims are underestimated because the social cost is not 
affected by negligence rule. The operator complies by engaging a level of prevention equal to 
  . As a consequence, for victims, the expected costs of a risky 
activity write as: 
(11)   
Hence, the victim bears the full consequences of the harm occurrence when the court 
recognizes that the operator complied with the optimum level of safety  . Furthermore, 
when the injurer does not fulfill the prevention level and if the court undervalues damages, 
then, the victims run the risk of not being entirely reimbursed for the incurred damage. 
Consquently, a rational operator has interest to comply with the socially optimal level of care 
and will spend  . Consequently, under a rule of negligence, even when the level of 
damage is uncertain, the optimum level of preventions settles at its highest level. 
1.3 Rule of negligence: Some specific results  
Judges have to be very cautious about the determination of the prevention level. For 
instance, courts might wish restoring fairness and balancing the weight of the damage against 
the marginal increase in safety. Thus, they might not follow the regulator’s will. Besides, 
Craswell and Calfee (1986) were the first to underline of the possibility of mistakes from the 
Courts side. Indeed, Courts might err in determining what the first best level of care should 
be. However, this is not from this barrier side that we will analyze the point. Indeed, these 
points are well known and will not be developed here. We will study rather this increase of 
information that might get the judge when investigating the causes of an accident.  
Negligence and the determination of the effective level of prevention 
Hence, even if the injurer has reached this level of safety deemed as the first best by 
the regulator, the judge’s investigation can find evidence showing that this level is 
insufficient. For instance, the court could prove that the accident has been caused by human 9 
 
negligence, this, even if the operator took the first best care level. For example, this may be 
the case for human shortcomings (a sudden sick or drunk supervisor of a system at the origin 
of a disaster). Hence, under negligence, we can never take for granted the polluter’s 
exemption even if the required amount of prevention is similar to the strict liability scheme. 
Consequently, even if an operator complies with the optimal level of prevention, the 
probability of escaping liability is no longer equal to 1. The operator can consider that the 
court will be favorable to him with a probability equal to  , and will produce a negative 
judgment with a probability  . Consequently, he can expect the following issue:  
(12) 
 
This writing shows that complying with the first order level of prevention is no longer 
an insurance against the involvement of the operator’s liability. As a consequence, the 
operator may be tempted to undersize the level of prevention. Indeed, we can check that he is 
not induced to supply the efficient level of care. To see that, it is sufficient to compute the 
first order conditions of  :  
(13)   
Obviously, by the same argument than for proposition 1, we find that   (i.e. 
the operator is not induced to achieve the same level of prevention effort). However, we have 
a paradoxical result, because, if  , then the cost of prevention will not be 
 but, rather,  . His interest could then to conform to the 
optimum level. However, this is the case only if 
where   is that effort of safety which 
maximizes   Hence, we can consider that the operator will comply if the 
following relationship is verified: 
 
As   increases, i.e. as the probability to involve a compliant operator becomes higher, 
the conditions that verify the above relationship become weaker.  
Negligence and the suing costs 
Let us assume now that plaintiffs undergo sue costs and taxes if they lose. We expect 
that the defendant is solvent and that she can reimburse the amount   when the plaintiffs 
win. Does this state of matter have consequences on the social cost function? Let us assume 10 
 
that the plaintiff sue the tortfeaser every time that he can check any damage. He incurs the 
total cost   if they lose and gain   in the opposite case. Then the probability of loosing 
is   (i.e. the probability of winning for a compliant operator) and   in case of winning 
these are simplified assumption compared to Shavell and Polinsky (1989). Then, for the 
victims, the expected cost are the following:  
(14)   
We can define the social cost for the rule of negligence that is settled at: 
(15)  +
 
And if the optimal level of care is fixed at   by the operator whishing avoiding 
the involvement in repairs, (i.e. if      is expected), the 
social cost is then:  
    
This value is higher than the social of a strict liability regime. Under negligence, 
victims should include the penalties associated to the possibility of having sued the injurer. 
Negligence and transaction costs 
We extend the analysis and we combine now the existence of transaction cost and 
uncertainty. These transaction costs (  are associated to the necessity to gather evidence 
and they can be borne either by the victims or the defendant because in each case they 
contribute to inflate the social cost. Here, we consider that the burden of the evidence is 
endured by the victims but, we could inverse the process and let them paid by the injurer 
without changing the final result. As before we express the expected cost of the polluter: 
(16) 
 
And, for the potential victims when submitted to bear the burden of the proof: 
(17) 
 
Naturally, the expected social cost writes as: 
(18)   with  11 
 
(19)   
Using the same proof scheme than for establishing proposition 1, we get the expected 
result that the level of prevention will be weaker under the assumption of positive transaction 
costs. Naturally, the previous paragraph and this one could be combined, the distance between 
the social cost of a strict liability regime and the one of a negligence rule increases because 
none of them incorporate the same components.  
As a conclusion, the introduction of uncertainty raises question about the conditions of 
comparing liability regimes in tort law. The more precise are becoming the features of 
uncertainty, the more difficult it is becoming defining the frontiers of their mutual assessment.  
 
 
2.  Ambiguity theory and uncertainty about damages 
In most theoretical contributions, the maximum level of damage is known. It can be 
considered as given or depending on the level of prevention. In the latter case, the higher the 
prevention effort, the lesser the consequences of a major accident are
6. However, one can 
imagine that a given operator can experience difficulty in identifying with certainty the 
maximum level of damage. This uncertainty applies even when is reached the higher level of 
safety. Hence, the operator can consider that the maximum value of damage may be 
comprised inside an interval between a high and a low value. For example, the explosion of a 
fuel tank could produce harm equivalent to either x or y thousand euro. Polluting leakage of 
groundwater could cost either 500,000 euro or three millions, and so on. Generally, faced with 
this kind of accident, it is only exceptionally that the actual amount of damage could be a 
priori known and/or knowable. However, the probabilities of potential maximum damage may 
be estimated (by a regulatory agency for instance) and its distribution known by the operator. 
Then, he may form estimates about them and he can either overestimate this level (or thus 
underestimate the minimum damage) or the reverse. Hence, in determining the prevention 
effort the potential polluter will fix its own estimate of the maximum amount of the loss. This 
is the foundation of an alternative theory of utility based on the observation of behavior facing 
true uncertainty (unspecified or ambiguous probabilities) and not only risky uncertainty 
(specified probabilities).  
                                                            
6  See for instance Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi, (2003). 12 
 
Literature on this theme began in the early fifties with the Allais’ criticisms and, then 
the Ellsberg’s Paradox in 1961. We give a quick overview of the question but we ask to the 
interested lector to refer to Teitelbaum (2007)’s contribution which is more complete than 
ours. Let us consider that an agent has to select two alternative actions. In the first one, he can 
choose one actions for which the probabilities for results are known (for instance drawing a 
blue ball in an urn that contains blue and red balls in a known proportion). In the second one, 
the choice is the same but the proportions are unknown (balls blue and red are in an unknown 
ratio). Experiences have shown that most of people will prefer to select the first alternative, 
i.e. the urn in which the proportion of red and blue balls is known. Agents feel aversion for 
the ambiguous choice present in the second alternative. This leads to implicitly allocate prior 
probabilities to the second choice with the result that the sum of probabilities for a given 
event are higher than 1. Schmeidler (1989) systematized ambiguity by applying Choquet’s 
integral to expected theory utility. Ambiguity is understood as the lack of confidence of an 
agent in his faith about the distribution of probability of uncertain events. For ambiguity 
theory, non-additive probability or capacity represents agent’s beliefs about the likelihood of 
these uncertain events. Agents maximize an expected utility function with respect to capacity. 
This utility is computed by Choquet integral. This expression allows taking into account 
ambiguity and behaviors facing uncertainty. More precisely, concave capacity involves 
optimism (super-additivity) while a convex one entails pessimism (subadditivity)
7.  
Teitelbaum (2007) applies the results of ambiguity theory to the determination of the 
level of prevention and show that neither strict liability nor negligence rule can reach the 
socially optimal level of prevention. More precisely, he refers to a specific application of 
Choquet expected utility theory developed by Chateauneuf, Eichenberger and Grant (2007), 
(CEG in the following).Theses authors develop the concept of neo-additive capacity. The 
difference between capacity and neo-additive capacity is that this last one is additive on non-
extreme outcomes. Neo-additive capacity allows systematizing optimistic and pessimistic 
attitudes towards uncertainty. This gives foundation to the empirical evidence that in real 
world, investors do not behave according the patterns of the theory of expected utility. 
Camerer and Weber (1992) reviewed and gathered the whole set of significant criticisms 
brought to standard expected utility theory. Gonzales and Wu (1999) or Abdellaoui (2000) 
and many others by empirical studies showed that, in real world, when they are led to bet, 




This is shown by an inverse S-shaped curve that represents the willingness to bet   
weighting the probability   of events. Individuals prefer to bet when the probability of 
winning is low (for national lottery tickets for instance) and are more reluctant to bet when the 
probability of winning is high.  
The neo-additive weighting scheme defined by CFG (2007) makes possible the 
modeling of the certainty and the possibility effect represented in the famous inverse-S-
shaped probability put into evidence by the above mentioned empirical studies. Before 
explaining this point, CFG (2007) underline that neo-additive weighting issue on neo-additive 
capacity. This concept corresponds to a probability weighting function. We present in 
appendix 1 the mathematical foundations of the model that takes into account neo-additive 
capacity. To give a more fluent presentation here, we consider only that the polluter and the 
society cannot assess with certainty the exact value of a maximum damage. Let be   the 
finite set of states to which correspond the catastrophic events  ( -algebra of  ). We 
consider a finite set of outcomes ( ) and a set of simple functions     
from states to outcomes which correspond to simple acts and takes on values: 
. We define the maximum damage function as the expected costs of the 
maximum damages  : 
(20)       
The neo-additive capacity is then (see appendix 1 for details):  
(21)   
Let us consider that   (i.e. the minimum of the maximum damage 
and  , the highest one. Then, for   we define the neo-
additive capacity as: 
(22)       
Replacing still these factors we get the Choquet integral that expresses the maximum 
damage: 
(23)      14 
 
We materialize here what has been announced above. Hence, here, the Choquet 
integral of a neo-additive capacity is the weighted sum of, respectively, the minimum, the 
maximum and the expectation of the damage value of a major harm. 
Here, optimism and pessimism refer to the scope of the major accident. Optimism 
involves high value of   (that it to say the lowest damage) and a low value of   tends to 
over-weight the highest harm  . Conversely to Teitelbaum’s analysis that distinguishes only 
two values (the probabilities of a major accident), here the range of possible values for the 
harm is high because it spans the set of events  .  
Let us notice that, when   (pessimistic feeling), 
, depends on the behavior of the injurer towards ambiguity, 
i.e. here, the value  . To see its meaning, consider (besides the fact that  ), that  . 
Then, the capacity reduces to  , that means that the injurer feels no ambiguity on the 
probability distribution,  . The higher   is the less confident is the 
operator about the prevalent probability distribution of major accident. For an absolute 
distrust in it ( ), we have: 
(24)       
This expression corresponds to the Hurwitz criteria weighted by the degree of 
optimism and optimism of the injurer. If, furthermore, the injurer is very pessimistic ( ), 
he will tend to consider that the highest level of the harm will occur  . However, before 
going further, we have to note that the condition for having the Choquet integral of the 
expected cost of the injurer higher than the major damage cost expectation, is that: 
(25)      or, still,  
(26)        
Hence,   if   and   if 
(27)        
(We recall that because of its definition (see appendix 1), the only condition on   is 
positivity). 15 
 
These relationships show that the importance of the degrees of optimism and 
pessimism in the assessment of the expected cost of major damage. We can notice that the 
level of ambiguity aversion vanishes in the comparison. Having defined the background of the 
analysis we can see how to apply it to our analysis. 
2.1 Strict liability with solvent and unworthy operator 
In what follows the relationships between   and the expected Choquet cost of 
major damage are fundamental. The injurer selects a level of prevention effort that solves: 
(28)       sc   
The regulator cannot take into account the optimism or the pessimism of the operator. 
Consequently, the regulator is assumed risk neutral and, following Shavell(1986) and 
Beard(1990), we consider that the socially optimal level of care is the solution of : 
(29)       sc   
We can immediately check that the solutions of both the injurer and the regulator do 
not coincide. Indeed, when   the injurer will tend to over-invest and to under-
invest in safety in the converse case. We join not only the results of Teitenbaum (2007) or 
Cooter (1983) but still those of Beard (1990) that shows that under the threat of being 
considered as judgement-proof, operators may over-invest in safety compared to the first best 
safety level. To illustrate this particular point, let us assume that the wealth   of the operator 
is limited: 
(30)         
Where   is the starting point from which the harm that goes beyond the operator’s 
wealth. Let us assume now that the operator distrust fully the official distribution of accident 
probability and, as a consequence, he has an absolute preference for ambiguity  . We 
assume also that he is absolutely pessimistic ( ). Then  = . 
Then, the program of the polluter is then: 
(31)      s.c. 
 
That means that the amount of his wealth binds the compensation amount to 
.Then,   is this safety level that minimizes the expected cost of the polluter, 
this expected cost will be   where  . 
The expected social cost is: 16 
 
(32)       
Where   is the optimum social level of safety.  
Let us assume that  . We recall that because his absolute pessimism and his 
absolute reluctance to accept the distribution of the accident probability, he thinks that the 
total amount of the harm will be  . Hence, in case of an accident he will have to compensate 
it by the amount of his whole asset which is here  . 
Because  , by simple calculus, we can see that  . That means that 
the operator over invests in safety compared to the regulator’s requirement.  
As a consequence, the result is robust and can take into consideration both the case of 
an unbounded wealth and the one of judgment proof under a strict liability regime. 
Furthermore, it is possible to understand how uncertainty about the scale of damage can issue 
either on overinvestment or underinvestment in safety.  
2.2 Negligence rule and ambiguity 
Ambiguity on the level of the maximum damage prevents an easy matching of strict 
liability versus negligence as in Teitelbaum (2007). Linking them reveals difficult because 
under negligence the operator will tend to forecast the judge’s ambiguity aversion. Indeed, 
under negligence, the operator will not seek to determine his own level of prevention but the 
one of the judge. This point is not that amazing. For instance, in some countries, environment 
harm may be weakly considered and judges are usually lenient with polluters. Obviously, this 
state of matters inflects the injurer’s behavior.  
The components of the polluter’s uncertainty are at least twice. Indeed, first, naturally, 
uncertainty bears on the level of damages: the polluter ignores the true scale of the major 
harm. Second, uncertainty stands on the determination by the court on who is liable of the 
damage. Consequently, the potential polluter will tend to determine the level of due care by 
assessing the behavior of the court. The injurer can assess the capacity of the court as the 
following 
(33)       
Where   and   are the parameters of optimism and ambiguity aversion of the Court 
as assessed by the operator. We deduce the Choquet integral: 
(34)       
We define then the Choquet expected cost function of the operator under the rule of 
negligence. 17 
 
(35)       
Or more explicitly: 
(36)     
We have gathered all the elements to settle our main proposition which is the 
following: 
Proposition 2: Under uncertainty, when agents feel aversion for ambiguity, neither 
the negligence rule nor the strict liability rule can be considered as a superior rule comparing 
them mutually.   
The formal proof of the proposition is somewhat tedious and we relegate it to 
Appendix 2. This proposition settles that choosing among the mentioned liability rule cannot 
be accomplished on the ground of the comparison of their relative performance under true 
uncertainty. Indeed, the regulator cannot a priori forecast how reluctant to ambiguity will be 
the injurer. Consequently, from a methodological viewpoint, it is difficult to conceive an 
enforcement rule depending on the state of mind of the potential polluters or tortfeasors.   
Hence, here, conversely to Teitelbaum’s conclusions that give preference for the rule 
of negligence, proposition 2 show that enforcing a liability regulation under uncertainty 
requires more information than the simple assessment of their economic mutual efficiency. If 
our results were to be combined with the ones of Teitelbaum’s ones, then the indeterminacy 
about the choice of a liability rule would be absolute. Indeed, in such a situation the injurer 
would form beliefs on the distribution of probability of accident and on the one of the scale of 
accident.  
We give now some illustration considering some particular cases. 
2.3 Some particular cases  
We can see that it is only if   and   that the correspondence with the usual 
analysis can be made. Hence, the injurer considers that the Court will behave like himself 
experiencing the same ambiguity aversion and the same degree of optimism/pessimism about 
the Court feeling. We can deduce then the following propositions: 
Proposition 3: If the operator thinks that he and the Court are sharing the same 
aversion for ambiguity, i.e.  , but not the same optimism level  , then   
Proof: 
We consider the conditions for having: 18 
 
?; 
Then, this is false independently of the level of   and  , indeed, developing we get 
 and, as a consequence , which is contradictory with  
 
Consequently, when   and   
 
Proposition 4: If the operator thinks that he shares with the Court the same optimism 
level  , but not the same aversion for ambiguity, i.e.   then 
   if   
 if   
Proof: obvious, similar to the proof of proposition 1 and sub-propositions 1,2 and 3 in 
appendix 2. 
From proposition 3 we show that, if the operator thinks that the judge and he are 
sharing the same ambiguity aversion, the level of optimism of the judge does not “push” to 
overestimate the level of damage. Consequently, in this case, the negligence rule does not 
induce the injurer to overinvest in safety. From proposition 4, it appears that when the judge 
and the operator share the same level of optimism but diverge on the assessment of the 
distribution of probability of major accident, then either   or   according his 
level of optimism   is higher or lesser than the ratio  . We know that 
 (because  ). Then, if   that means that the injurer 
feels more pessimistic than in the opposite case. To see that, it sufficient to take a low value 
of  , that gives a high weight to the pessimistic situation. Then, this involves that the 
operator assesses that the judge will estimate the Choquet integral at a higher value that 
himself would have done under a strict liability regime. Consequently,   and then, 
this would induce him to produce a higher level of safety. However, in the opposite case he 
will decrease this level.  19 
 
Even if the above cases appear as particular cases, these tend to confirm the previous 
results that the negligence rule is not more efficient than the strict liability rule because of 
their high dependence on the beliefs of the injurer. 
2.4  A step further : Negligence rule and the judge as a regulator 
What does the judge assess under a negligence rule? An obvious answer is that he 
checks whether the prevention effort made by the injurer suits well with the requirement of 
the social planner i.e. the first best level of safety. This answer conforms to standard theory 
which considers that the regulator determines this level. The direct consequence is that the 
judge is in the passive role to comply (under perfect information) or to mistake about this 
level. However, under uncertainty and a negligence rule, as shown above, the judge can find 
that the set of measures taken by the injurer is insufficient, then, he complements the 
regulator’s assessment. This is particularly the case with the cases of administrative Courts. In 
most countries, administrative decisions are taken under the control of administrative courts. 
In several countries, administrative courts are separated from general courts with their own 
organization in local administrative court, appeals court and Supreme Administrative Court. 
This is the Case in Western Europe (France, Italy and in most European Countries). In the 
United States, several federal agencies are gifted with administrative law judges. This is the 
case for environmental concerns with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This state 
of matter involves that the citizens can question the administrative determinations. Hence, the 
administrative judge can modify the administrative decision by substituting his own rules. We 
can quote U. Desai (2002, p.187) “Nevertheless, administrative courts play an important role 
in environmental policy and conflicts. They exercise comprehensive judicial control over 
administrative actions, (.), and they are often mobilized by third parties in the course of 
licensing or planning procedures, with the aim of achieving tighter environmental standards 
or stopping projects or operating plants”. 
That means that, ex post, the court can define a legal standard different as the previous 
one determined by the regulator. Against the above consideration, it may be argued that 
administrative law is few concerned with negligence rule that belongs to the field civil law. 
Caroll, (2007), shows the difficulty involving authorities in negligence. But this is not the aim 
here. The relationship with administrative law has been induced for heuristic reasons only. 
The aim was of showing that in an uncertain world, courts could complement and correct the 
regulator’s assessment.  20 
 
Hence, under a rule of negligence, the courts are led to investigate and acquire more 
information as shown previously. This involves that even if he thinks that all prevention 
measures have been taken the operator is never sure of having fully complied with the socially 
required level of prevention.  
We assume that Courts assess the optimum level of prevention effort by taking into 
account the set of information given by the investigation procedure. As a result, the injurer 
faces the situation in which either he made the right level of effort (first best) or, in the 
opposite, he supplied an insufficient one. From his view point the result is random and let   
be the probability that the court confirms his investment, (and, conversely,  , the 
probability that he did not invest enough in safety). 
Reaching this stage, we cannot consider that the usual presentation of negligence rule 
can be maintained as such. This means that the injurer will dedicate only   in prevention 
investment if the court agrees with him, with a probability of   and he will have to pay 
 in the opposite case with a probability of  . The consequence of the 
above consideration is that the injurer cannot be involved automatically if he does not perform 
the optimum level required by the regulator. In this case, the effective expected cost will be:   
(37)       
We can show that this new factor of uncertainty can increase the ambiguity aversion or 
preference of the operator. Indeed after developing the above part of (37), 
(38)   
Then the error factor can be introduced in the bracket.  
(39)   
That means that this supplementary factor of uncertainty can be “translated” in terms 
of optimism or pessimism. To do that, we are looking for the new expression of optimism, 
which is expressed by the variable  : 
(40)      
 
And, then solving the above system gives the expression of  : 
(41)        
The condition to be respected is that   which is true for: 21 
 
(42)       
In the present table we present the static analysis of the variation of    according the 
variation each variable: 
 












We just give a quick analysis of the above table. We can see that an increase in the 
maximum level of damage tends to decrease the level of optimism ((a) with  ) while 
a raise in the minimum (of the maximum) damage   tends to increase it. As expected, a rise 
in the genuine level of optimism   increase the new optimism level ((c)  ) and an 
augment in the degree of ambiguity involves, a raise in optimism. 
We can show that when there is some uncertainty on the determination of the first rank 
efficiency of prevention the safety effort is lesser than when there is certainty. 
Proposition 5: Under negligence rule, if the probability to conform with the standard 
of the regulator is uncertain (probability  ), the first best level of prevention effort is 
below that level reached under no uncertainty about the standard. 
Proof (appendix 3). 
The proof of this proposition is quite heavy and is developed in annex 3. 
As a consequence, under uncertainty about the extent of damage, when it is known 
that the court investigates about the effective prevention effort, the injurer will tend to under 
invest in safety.  
4.  Concluding remarks 
Introducing uncertainty in the standard unilateral accident model involves ipso-facto 
the introduction of agency relationships. Indeed, if the regulator and the potential injurers 
disagree about the level of prevention effort to supply, in the interest of Society, regulator has 
to induce the tortfeasors to supply the first best level of safety. As a consequence, the 
comparison of performance between liability regimes is a direct consequence of the 
introduction of uncertainty. The first part of this paper has shown that defining each regime 22 
 
by its specificities leads to keep them away from each other. However, the task remained 
incomplete and a more general treatment was needed. The application of ambiguity theory to 
this field allowed making the analysis more systematic.  
The credit goes to Teitelbaum (2007) for having applied first ambiguity theory to the 
accident standard model. We extend his approach to understand the consequences when 
maximum damages are uncertain. Then, we show that comparing liability regimes on the 
basis of their relative performances (safety effort level) is no longer possible. In each case, the 
injurer is not only led either to overinvesting or under-investing in safety compared to the 
social first best care level as in Teitelbaum(2007), but also, it is particularly difficult to 
establish definitively which regime outstrips the other one. Indeed, we cannot define a clear 
decision rule about the best liability instrument that should be enforced. Putting it otherwise, 
sometimes strict liability fits better, sometimes it is negligence.  
This result does not mean that a government should not implement a liability scheme 
as a regulatory instrument. Liability rules keep their deterrent effect on negligent behavior of 
potential injurers. It indicates that enforcing a liability regime cannot be based on safety 
performance only. The government should consider many other kinds of variables rather than 
strict efficiency in terms of level of safety effort. For instance, he could regard the transaction 
costs associated with the necessary investigation about evidence for fault under a rule of 
negligence, the fairness of letting the burden of the recovery to society when mistake cannot 
be proved from the polluter side. We find again the Calabresi (1970)’s considerations who 
takes every liability regime as a whole. Hence, if general result cannot be defined, this 
involves a close examination of the condition of application of liability rule according the 
specificity of the potential harm, the causal link, the number of potential victims, the time 
necessary to gather evidence and the associated transaction costs, etc. For instance, the 
European directive on environmental liability
8 distinguishes between activities which require 
allowances or permits and activities that need not. Facilities that can have far reaching 
consequences on the environment are submitted to a strict liability regime, while the other 
ones, because they work a lower scale will resort to a negligence rule only.   
Other secondary results consist in specific consideration about both regimes. For 
instance, we show that the application of ambiguity theory to the maximum damage can be 
extended to the judgment-proof question by finding again the Beard (1990)’s conclusions. We 
show also that, under negligence and uncertainty, the Courts are led to investigate for 
                                                            
8 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, L143/56, 30/4/04). 23 
 
determining who should bear the burden of repairs. This can induce court to define a different 
optimum level of safety effort compared to the one defined by the regulator. We materialized 
this change by a probability distribution. We show that this factor deters the injurer to provide 
the highest level of care. The direct consequence of such a possibility is to increase the 







Neo-additive capacity and Choquet utility function 
We do not propose here a full formal mathematical presentation. The interested lector 
may refer to the clear exposition of Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant S., (2007).  
A capacity is an extension of a probability. Formally, this is a function   that 
assigns real numbers to events  , where   is the set built from the set   of the states of 
nature. To be a capacity the following two conditions should be fulfilled. First, for all 
, and  , then   as monotonicity condition and second, as 
normalization conditions,   and  . 
The best way to integrate capacities is the Choquet integral. To do that, it is assumed 
that exists a simple function of finite range  such that it takes values  . A 
Choquet integral of a simple function   with respect to a capacity   is defined as: 
 
Through the concept of neo-additive capacity the Choquet integral overweight high 
outcomes if the capacity is concave or overweigh low income if the capacity is convex. 
Convexity of a capacity is verified by the following relationships: 
   (and concave in the opposite situation).  
Applying this to our model, we consider that the polluter and the society cannot assess 
with certainty the exact value of a maximum damage. Let be   the finite set of states to 
which correspond the catastrophic events  ( -algebra of  ). We consider a finite set of 
outcomes (  ) and let   be a set of simple functions from states to 
outcomes which correspond to simple acts and takes on values  . 
The polluter is gifted with a Choquet objective function which corresponds here to an 
expected cost function. His beliefs on the level of damage correspond to a neo-additive 
capacity   based on  . Hence, the operator will form beliefs about the level of the 
damage. This is a supplementary uncertainty. We can define now the neo-additive capacity. 
To do that let us consider that the  -algebra   is partitioned in three subsets that we present 
and characterize (for a more complete information see CFG (2002, 3). 
-  The set of null events   where   and for  , and   if  . 
-  The set of “universal events” , in which an event is certain to occur, 
(complement of each member of the set  ). 
-  The set of essential events,  , in which events are neither impossible nor certain. 
This set is composed of the following: 
 
Before going further, we define the following capacities   (see appendix): 
 if   and 0 otherwise and   for   and   
otherwise. 
Furthermore, we define a finite additive probability   such that , 
if  and 1 otherwise. 25 
 
Definition 1: Let  ,   that belong to a simplex   in  , 
( ), a neo-additive capacity   based on the 
distribution of probability   is defined as: 
 
We can check here that a neo-additive capacity is additive on non-extreme outcomes. 
Here   corresponds to the probability of a major accident of a given scale. This is a common 
belief and   represents the degree of confidence of the agent in this belief. We will 
give below, after the presentation of the Choquet integral of the neo-additive capacity, more 
complete explanation on the concept of optimism.  
Then, we can define the Choquet integral which is a weighted sum of the minimum, 
the maximum and the expectation of a simple function   as the following 
relationship: 
 
Where   is the expected value of the expected costs of a major accident, and from 
the linearity of the Choquet integral with respect to the capacity,   and 
, (proof see CFG(2002, 3) and CFG(2006, 3).  
Then for  , we put,   and 
. As,   is a finitely additive probability distribution on  , we 
define   as: 
 
Taking into account these factors, the Choquet integral writes now: 
 
We can immediately check that if  , we find the usual expected utility. With 
, , the subject is waiving between the lowest value and the expected value of 
the function. That corresponds to pessimism because the operator cannot consider that   
occurs with sufficiently high probability. Then, optimism is induced by  ,  .  
However, to keep a correspondence with the analysis of Teitelbaum (2007) we will 
make the following change of variable: 
,  , then we can check that   with   
The neo-additive capacity is then:  
 
Or, still, for   
 





Proposition 2: Under uncertainty, when agents feel aversion for ambiguity, neither 
the negligence rule nor the strict liability rule can be considered as a superior rule comparing 
them mutually.  
Proof  
The proof requires several steps, conceived as a set of sub-propositions. We compare 
the consequences of assessing the prevention cost under strict liability and negligence when 
the potential injurer feels aversion to ambiguity. (  is his Choquet integral under strict 
liability and   under negligence).  
Sub-proposition 1: 
 if   and 
 if   
Proof: 
The proof is very simple. We compare   
and  and by simple arithmetic with deduce the above results. 
Sub-proposition 2: 
If  , then the level of effort of prevention made under the Choquet integral 
 by the operator is higher than under .  In the opposite, when  , the reverse is 
true.  
Proof: 
This comes from the comparison of the first order conditions of   and 
. 
Adopting the same argument than used in proposition 1 we can show that when 
, then the optimum associated to  ,  ,  is higher than the one associated to  , 
, ( ). 
Sub-proposition 3: 
Sub-propositions 1 and 2 involves that : 
-  When  , then, the level of effort of prevention is higher under a 
negligence rule than under a strict liability regime. 
-  When  , then, the level of effort of prevention is higher under a strict 
liability regime than under a negligence rule. 
-  When   , both regime are equivalent.  
Proof :  
It is obvious from 2. 
-  Sub-proposition 4: From Sub-propositions 1 to 3, we can deduce that, whatever 
the liability regime, attitudes toward uncertainty is fundamental for determining 
the superiority of one regime on the other one.   
Proof:  
From sub-propositions 1 to 3, it is obvious that when enforcing a given liability regime, the 
regulator disposes of no means to know what will be (or what is) the state of mind of the 
operator. That means that the regulator cannot know the level of ambiguity aversion of the 27 
 
potential injurers. Hence, for instance, let us assume that a strict liability rule has been 
implemented. Then, the Choquet expected cost function   of a potential injurer yields a 
safety level equivalent to  . After calculation, the regulator can assess that a negligence rule 
would induce a Choquet integral equivalent to  , where   t h a t  f r o m  s u b -
proposition 2 yields  . Then the negligence rule should have been enforced. The 
argument can be fully reverted.  
Appendix 3 
 
Proposition 5: Under negligence rule, if the probability to conform with the standard 
of the regulator is uncertain (probability  ), the first best level of prevention effort is 
below that level reached under no uncertainty about the standard. 
Proof 
The proof needs two steps. First, we show that  . To show this, we can notice that 
if we put  , this involves that    We can show that this relation is 
false, because the right hand side of this expression is negative and  . Indeed, as 
, , indeed,  . Therefore,  . 
Second we compare   and  . If we put: 
 
 
this involves, after developing that    which is true.  
Then if   by the same argument used in proposition 1 we can show that the 
optimum effort corresponding to  ,   is less than the one corresponding to if  ,  , 
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Figure 1 
The behavior of the first order derivative of the probability of major harm 
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